Idaho Supreme Court

COEUR D’ALENE, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 2007 AT 8:50 A.M.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,



          Plaintiff-Respondent,



v.



JOHN CORNELL ANDERSON, III,



          Defendant-Appellant.

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Docket No. 33827

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Kootenai County. Honorable John T. Mitchell, District Judge.

Rude, Jackson & Daugharty, L.L.P., Coeur d’Alene, for appellant.

Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

          This is an appeal following John Anderson’s criminal conviction for misdemeanor domestic battery and felony harassing a witness. Anderson was arrested for shoving his wife several times in the front yard of his girlfriend’s residence. Several days after the incident, Anderson left a voicemail for one of the arresting officers. In the voicemail Anderson identified himself, commented on the pending domestic battery charge, and made threatening statements directed at the officer regarding the officer’s potential testimony. The officer saved a recording of the voicemail and reported Anderson’s actions to the prosecutor’s office.
          The two pending charges of domestic battery and harassing a witness were consolidated for trial. Anderson waived his right to counsel and chose to represent himself before the trial and through a jury trial. He was found guilty of both charges and acquired counsel for the sentencing proceeding. Anderson appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging error on the grounds of failure to knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel and error with jury instructions at trial. The Court of Appeals held that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel and that the issue of jury instructions would not be addressed because he failed to object at the time of trial. Anderson appeals to this Court.

COEUR D’ALENE, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 2007 AT 10:00A.M.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO



RALPH NAYLOR FARMS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company,

           Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.


LATAH COUNTY, IDAHO,

            Defendant-Respondent.
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Docket No. 33422

Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Latah County. Hon. Carl B. Kerrick, District Judge.

Creason, Moore & Dokken, PLLC, Lewiston, for appellant.

James E. M. Craig, Latah County Prosecuting Attorney, Moscow, for respondent.

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This case is an appeal from a decision of the district court denying Ralph Naylor Farms’ motion for an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to I.C. § 12-117 and I.R.C.P. 54(d).
            On March 2, 2005, the Latah County Board of Commissioners enacted Ordinance No. 258, an emergency ordinance for a ground water management overlay zone within a portion of Latah County. The ordinance prohibited certain activities within the overlay zone, including natural resource mineral extraction and processing. On June 27, 2005, Naylor Farms filed an application with the Latah County Planning and Building Department for a conditional use permit in order to conduct natural resource development on its property. The Planning and Building Department rejected the application, finding that Ordinance No. 258 prohibited such uses within the applicable zone.
            Naylor Farms filed a Complaint on July 25, 2005, seeking invalidation of Ordinance No. 258 as well as just compensation for an alleged regulatory taking. Both Naylor Farms and Latah County filed Motions for Summary Judgment. On May 9, 2006, the district court granted Naylor Farms’ Motion for Summary Judgment, invalidating Ordinance No. 258 and denied Latah County’s Motion for Summary Judgment. On May 19, 2006, Naylor Farms filed a Motion for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs. The court denied Naylor Farms’ motion on the basis that the court could not conclude that the County acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law when it enacted Ordinance No. 258. Naylor Farms now appeals that decision.

COEUR D’ALENE, THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 2007 AT 8:50 A.M.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

DOUG CANNON and CAREY CANNON, husband and wife, BEVERLY L. HINRICHS, and SONJA MORENO,



    Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross Respondents,



v.



KENDON H. PERRY and JUDY C. BROWN-PERRY, husband and wife, and the unknown heirs and/or devisees of the above named parties, if deceased, and any and all

other unknown parties claiming an interest in and to the following described real property situated in Kootenai County, State of Idaho, to-wit: 4801 Woodside Avenue, Coeur

d'Alene, Idaho,



    Defendants-Respondents-Cross Appellants.

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Docket No. 32847

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Kootenai County. Honorable John P. Luster, District Judge.

Greg D. Horne, Chtd., Coeur d’Alene, for appellants.

Ramsden & Lyons, LLP, Coeur d’Alene, for respondents.

            In October 2004 the Perrys agreed to sell their home in Coeur d’Alene, Idaho to Moreno and Hinrichs. The written contract named Moreno as the buyer. The parties later agreed that the buyer would change to Hinrichs, but no new written agreement was executed at that time.
            Closing was delayed because of difficulties arranging financing. After granting several verbal extensions, the Perrys drafted an instrument purporting to be “an addendum to the sales contract dated 11/29/04 between Kendon H. Perry as Seller and Beverly Hinrichs as Buyer” to “extend the deadline for closing to occur no later than the end of December 16^th, 2004.” At the time the “Addendum” was executed on December 7, however, there was no written agreement involving Hinrichs, nor was there any instrument dated November 29. The agreement with Moreno had been executed in October.
            Closing did not occur on December 16, again due to financing difficulties. On that day, however, the parties executed a “Purchase and Sell Agreement” which named Hinrichs as the buyer and specified “Escrow to close on or before December 30, 2004.” Although it was signed on December 16, the space next to each party’s signature bore the typewritten date “11/29/2004.” Neither party drafted the document; apparently it was drafted by the lender. The dates were inserted before either party received the document. It did not mention the Addendum.
            The next day, December 17, the Perrys sent a letter rescinding all previous agreements to sell the property. They refused to take any further action towards closing and sold the house at a higher price to another buyer. Hinrichs and Moreno sued for specific performance, as did the Cannons, friends of Moreno’s who were tenants in the property.
            The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Perrys, finding that the Addendum unambiguously modified the December 30 deadline to December 16. The Perrys were awarded attorney fees against Moreno and Hinrichs but not against the Cannons. Moreno and Hinrichs appealed, and the Perrys cross appealed as to the denial of attorney fees against the Cannons.

COEUR D’ALENE, THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 2007 AT 10:00 A.M.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

VERONICA GLAZE and VIOLA RALSTON,



          Petitioners-Appellants,



v.



JAMES DEFFENBAUGH,



         Respondent.
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Docket No. 33303

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Kootenai County. Hon. John P. Luster, District Judge.

Monica Brennan, Coeur d’Alene, Idaho, for appellants.

Feltman, Gebhardt, Greer & Zeimantz, P.S, Spokane, Washington, and Mark J. Harris, Spokane, Washington, for respondent.

Appellants Veronica Glaze and Viola Ralston sued their father, Respondent James Deffenbaugh, for civil damages stemming from allegations that he sexually molested them as children between 1975 and 1979. The district court granted summary judgment to Deffenbaugh partly based on the statutes of limitation found in Idaho Code §§ 5-219 and 6-1704. Glaze and Ralston now appeal to this Court asserting that the district court erred in applying the statutes of limitation to this case.

COEUR D’ALENE, THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 2007 AT 11:10 A.M.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

IN THE MATTER OF CHARLES ALBERT PINKHAM, DECEASED.

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CATHERINE R. GARCIA,



          Plaintiff-Respondent,



v.



ALBERT LEROY PINKHAM a/k/a LLEWELLYN A PINGREE,



          Defendant-Appellant.

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Docket No. 33330

Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District, State of Idaho, Latah County. Honorable John R. Stegner, District Judge.

Mabbutt & Mumford, Moscow, for appellant.

Whitney & Whitney, LLP, Moscow, for respondent.

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Appellant Leroy Albert Pinkham, aka Llewellyn Albert Pingree (Pinkham), and Respondent Catherine Garcia were separated in 1972. Garcia was granted custody of the couple’s son, Charles Albert Pinkham. During a scheduled visitation, without Garcia’s knowledge or consent, Pinkham relocated with Charles and changed their names. Charles died in a car accident in 1981; Garcia was unable to locate her son before his death. Garcia learned of her son’s death later in 1981 and of his place of burial, Moscow, Idaho, in 1982.
             In 2005, twenty-three years after learning where her son was buried, Garcia filed a petition for reinterment requesting that Charles’s body be exhumed and reinterred in New Mexico, where Garcia resides. Pinkham filed a Motion to Dismiss based on laches. The district court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss and denied the motion holding that because Pinkham came into court with “unclean hands” he could not assert the equitable defense of laches. After trial, the district court made a final decision in the case, concluding that Pinkham failed to prove laches, had unclean hands, and that Garcia had shown reasonable cause for disinterment. On appeal, Pinkham argues that the district court incorrectly applied the unclean hands doctrine when it denied his motion to dismiss.

BOISE, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 2007 AT 8:50 A.M.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,



          Plaintiff-Respondent,



v.



JOSHUA ALLEN ROSE,



          Defendant-Appellant.

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Docket No. 33637

            Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Ada

            County. Honorable Thomas F. Neville, District Judge

            Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

            Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

            Joshua Rose appeals from the district court’s order revoking probation. Rose claims he was denied an opportunity to confront adverse witnesses because the district court admitted hearsay at the evidentiary hearing on whether he violated the terms of his probation. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation as set forth in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) does not apply to probation revocation proceedings, and that the lesser confrontation right afforded as a matter of due process under Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) was not violated. This Court granted review as to whether Crawford applies to a probationer’s due process right of confrontation.

BOISE, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 2007 AT 10:00 A.M.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

GERALD ROSS PIZZUTO, JR.,

                 Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF IDAHO,

                Respondent.

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Docket No. 32679

Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Idaho County. Hon. George R. Reinhardt III, District Judge.

Joan M. Fisher, Capital Habeas Unit Federal Defenders Services of Idaho, Moscow, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent.

Gerald Pizzuto appeals the district court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he is mentally retarded and that his execution is barred by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia.
             In 1986, Pizzuto was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of felony murder, and one count of grand theft, all in connection with the deaths of Delbert and Berta Herndon in 1985. Pizzuto was sentenced to death. Pizzuto subsequently appealed his convictions and filed four separate petitions for post-conviction relief. His murder convictions were upheld on appeal. His first four petitions for post-conviction relief were dismissed, and those dismissals were also upheld on appeal.
             On June 19, 2003, Pizzuto filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he is mentally retarded and that his execution is prohibited under Atkins v. Virginia. The State moved to summarily dismiss Pizzuto’s petition on the grounds that it was untimely and would constitute the retroactive application of new law in violation of Idaho Code § 19-2719(5)(c). Pizzuto moved for summary judgment on the ground that there were no genuine issues of material facts in this case. After a hearing, the district court denied Pizzuto’s motion for summary judgment and granted the State’s motion to dismiss. The district court found that the petition was not timely filed and must therefore be dismissed. The district court further found that if Pizzuto’s petition was timely filed, it must nonetheless be dismissed because Pizzuto failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact supporting his claim of mental retardation.
             Pizzuto argues on appeal that the district court’s dismissal of his petition as untimely violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and to due process of law, and is inconsistent with the relevant Idaho statute. He also argues that the district court imposed the incorrect standard of mental retardation. Pizzuto further argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the district judge.
             The State rejects Pizzuto’s claims, and argues on appeal that the district court correctly dismissed his petition as untimely. The State also argues that Pizzuto’s successive petition is not supported by material facts supporting his claim of mental retardation. The State further argues that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Pizzuto’s motion to disqualify the district judge.

BOISE, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 2007 AT 11:10 A.M.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,



           Plaintiff-Respondent,



v.



PAUL LAWRENCE ROGERS,



           Defendant-Appellant.



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Docket No. 33935

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Honorable Ronald J. Wilper. District Judge.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

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           Appellant Paul L. Rogers was charged with possession of a methamphetamine and driving without privileges. Rogers reached a plea agreement with the State, wherein the State, among other things, agreed to dismiss the case altogether provided that Rogers successfully completed Ada County Drug Court Program (ACDCP). The district court judge then transferred Rogers to the drug court.
            During the course of Rogers’s participation in ACDCP he violated various ACDCP rules and was sanctioned twice. After these initial violations of the drug court program’s rules Rogers seemed to improve markedly and even twice earned praise for his performance from the drug court judge. However, on June 30, 2004, the drug court judge confronted Rogers with information suggesting Rogers had been attempting to solicit fellow drug court participants to enter into a prostitution ring. At a show-cause hearing on July 14, 2004, the judge terminated Rogers from the drug court program, and later conducted a sentencing hearing and sentenced Rogers to a unified sentence of five years, with one year fixed, and retained jurisdiction for 180 days.
            Rogers appealed, contending that the court denied him the due process he was entitled to under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution when it terminated Rogers from the drug court program and that the drug court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Rogers then petitioned this Court for review of that decision, and we granted that petition.

BOISE, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 2007 AT 8:50 A.M.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO



J. CHARLES BLANTON,

                        Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

CANYON COUNTY,

                        Respondent.

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               Docket No. 33439

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Joel D. Horton, District Judge.

Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A., Boise, for appellant.

David L. Young, Canyon County Prosecutor, Caldwell, for respondent.

J. Charles Blanton appeals the district court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order of Dismissal of Petition for Judicial Review, entered August 10, 2006, wherein the district court dismissed his action for want of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court found Blanton had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by failing to appear for scheduled hearings before the Board of Equalization and the Board of Tax Appeals prior to his trial de novo appeal to the district court.
            Blanton raises three issues on appeal to contest the district court’s findings. Among them, Blanton argues that the district court erred in finding he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Blanton argues that he did exhaust his remedies despite the fact that he was not physically present at the administrative hearings because the applicable statutes and rules do not require physical presence.
            Canyon County rejects Blanton’s arguments, and asks this Court to affirm the district court. Canyon County also requests an award of attorney fees on appeal.

BOISE, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 2007 AT 10:00 A.M.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,



          Plaintiff-Respondent,



v.



DARREN B. HOOPER,



          Defendant-Appellant.

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Docket No. 33826

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Payette County. Hon. Stephen W. Drescher, District Judge.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

A jury convicted Darren B. Hooper of lewd conduct with a minor under the age of sixteen for anal/genital contact with his daughter, six-year-old A.H. At trial, the district court deemed A.H. unavailable and admitted a videotaped interview of the child under Idaho’s residual hearsay exceptions. After Hooper’s conviction, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), and Hooper appealed. The Court of Appeals held that a videotaped interview of the child victim was testimonial, the admission of the videotape was error, and that the error was not harmless. The court vacated the conviction and remanded for further proceedings. This Court granted the State’s petition for review.

BOISE, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 2007 AT 11:10 A.M.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO



STATE OF IDAHO,

      Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

STANLEY ELLIOTT OLIVER,

      Defendant-Appellant.

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               Docket No. 33899

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Michael R. McLaughlin, District Judge.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for Appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent.

Stanley Elliott Oliver (Oliver) was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) of alcohol and other intoxicating substances (two or more within five years) under Idaho Code §§ 18-8004, 18-8005(5). Oliver appeals his conviction on grounds that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict and that his sentence was excessive.
            On March 4, 2004, shortly after 5:00 p.m., Oliver struck the back of Ellen Lawrence’s (Lawrence) vehicle five times while traveling westbound on Chinden Boulevard. Immediately before the accident, a witness saw Oliver’s Toyota pickup travel about three-fourths of a block in the center turn lane, drift once into the oncoming eastbound lane, and make quick, jerky, erratic movements. Officers involved in the case observed that Oliver smelled of alcohol; he slurred his speech; it appeared he was intoxicated; he could not count backwards properly; his time perception was slowed; he failed the horizontal nystagmus test; and his eyes were jerky and couldn’t maintain a steady gaze.
             Oliver admitted to drinking a sixteen ounce beer and taking OxyContin, Clonazepan, Phenobarbital, and Carbamazepine on the day of the accident. Tests confirmed the presence of barbiturate and benzodiazepine and, specifically, Phenobarbital, Carbamazepine, and Oxycodone in his system. Oliver disputes that he was actually under the influence of these drugs, arguing that he blew only a .03 result on the intoxilyzer test, he passed the field sobriety test of reciting the alphabet, and that large new work boots made driving his Toyota with small foot pedals difficult. A pharmacologist at trial testified that OxyContin, Clonazepam, Phenbarbital, and Carbamazepine each can cause drowsiness, dizziness, and lack of coordination, and when combined, the effect of these four drugs are additive. The addition of even a small amount of alcohol also has the same additive effect.
              A jury found Oliver guilty of driving under the influence on December 10, 2004. The district court sentenced Oliver to five years in the custody of the Idaho Board of Corrections, with one year fixed and the remaining four years indeterminate. The court also suspended Oliver’s driving privileges for five years commencing on the date of his release from confinement. Oliver timely appealed. Although this is Oliver’s third DUI, and he admits that he has a serious alcohol problem, he challenges the indeterminate portion of his sentence on grounds that four years of parole will restrict his ability to move; require him to pay supervision fees; prohibit him from consuming alcoholic beverages; require him to report to the State; among many other requirements as determined by the Idaho Department of Corrections.
              The Idaho Court of Appeals initially heard the appeal and affirmed the district court in an unpublished opinion. This Court then granted Oliver’s petition for review.