## IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

## Docket Nos. 46232/46233

STATE OF IDAHO,	)
	) Filed: April 17, 2019
Plaintiff-Respondent,	)
	) Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk
V.	)
	) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
MARIA SOLEDAD RUIZ-SMALL,	) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
	) <b>BE CITED AS AUTHORITY</b>
Defendant-Appellant.	)
	)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Steven Hippler, District Judge.

Order revoking probation and execution of the underlying sentence, judgment of conviction and sentence, and order denying Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion, <u>affirmed</u>.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jenny C. Swinford, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

Before HUSKEY, Judge, LORELLO, Judge; and BRAILSFORD, Judge

## PER CURIAM

Maria Soledad Ruiz-Small pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, Idaho Code § 37-2732(c). The district court sentenced Ruiz-Small to a unified seven-year sentence, with three years determinate, suspended the sentence, and placed Ruiz-Small on probation. Subsequently, Ruiz-Small admitted to violating the terms of the probation and she pled guilty to a second charge of possession of a controlled substance, I.C. § 37-2732(c). The district court consequently revoked probation and ordered execution of the original seven-year sentence, with three years determinate. For the second possession of a controlled substance charge, the district

court imposed a unified five-year sentence, with two years determinate, to run concurrently. Ruiz-Small filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion, which the district court denied. Ruiz-Small appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation, imposing an excessive sentence, and denying her I.C.R. 35 motion.

It is within the trial court's discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the court is authorized under I.C.R. 35 to reduce the sentence. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). The court may also order a period of retained jurisdiction. I.C. § 19-2601. A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327. In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision to revoke probation. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012). Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are properly made part of the record on appeal. Id.

Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court's discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well established and need not be repeated here. *See State v. Hernandez*, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); *State v. Lopez*, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984); *State v. Toohill*, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant's entire sentence. *State v. Oliver*, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).

When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original

judgment. *State v. Hanington*, 148 Idaho 26, 29, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation. *Id.* Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the trial court that are properly made part of the record on appeal and are relevant to the defendant's contention that the trial court should have reduced the sentence sua sponte upon revocation of probation. *Morgan*, 153 Idaho at 621, 288 P.3d at 838.

Last, a motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency, addressed to the sound discretion of the court. *State v. Knighton*, 143 Idaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d 23, 24 (2006); *State v. Allbee*, 115 Idaho 845, 846, 771 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct. App. 1989). In presenting an I.C.R. 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the motion. *State v. Huffman*, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). Upon review of the record, including any new information submitted with Ruiz-Small's I.C.R. 35 motion, we conclude no abuse of discretion has been shown.

Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation, in sentencing, or in denying Ruiz-Small's I.C.R. 35 motion. Therefore, the judgment of conviction and sentence, order revoking probation and directing execution of Ruiz-Small's previously suspended sentence, and order denying Ruiz-Small's I.C.R. 35 motion are affirmed.