

# In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

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**IN RE: FORMATION AND MEMBERSHIP OF  
THE COURT SECURITY COMMITTEE**

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**ORDER**

On April 19, 1995, Chief Justice McDevitt entered an order *nunc pro tunc* to August 17, 1994, appointing a broad-based Idaho Supreme Court Security Committee to develop court facility security standards and procedures for Idaho (hereinafter “the 1994 Order”);

In 1996, the Court Security Committee published a “Court Facility Security Action Plan” (hereinafter “the 1996 Plan”).

By Order of the Supreme Court dated April 30, 1996, the Court approved and adopted the recommendations of that Plan and further requested the Administrative District Judges to appoint and organize Court Facility Security Committees in each county in their respective Districts. The 1994 Order, the Court’s April 30, 1996 Order, and the 1996 Plan are attached for ease of reference.

The Court has recently received a recommendation from the Administrative District Judges to re-establish a Court Security Committee with a primary focus being to update and revise the 1996 Plan; as well as review court facility security in light of current times, including advances in technology, social media, and the current state of the law with respect to weapons;

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a new Court Security Committee is appointed;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Committee shall consider all matters relevant to court facility security and make recommendations to the Supreme Court to include the following:

- (1) Review and advise the Supreme Court on the National Center for State Court's findings regarding Courthouse Violence;
- (2) Recommended procedures for education/training of judges and court personnel regarding security-related issues;
- (3) Identify best practices in the area of courthouse security;
- (4) Review court rules and Idaho statutes relating to security, including drafting of recommended rule and statutory changes that will improve courthouse security for courthouse users;
- (5) Revise and update the 1996 Plan including:
  - a. Court Facility Security Standards;
  - b. Recommended Procedures and Guidelines for Organizing Public Safety Programs in County Facilities;
  - c. County Facility Security Audits;
  - d. Facility Emergency Response Plans;
- (6) Any other relevant matters including those contained in the 1994 Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as used herein, the terms "courthouse" and "court facility" includes all facilities related to court functions such as courthouses, judicial annexes, and county probation offices, including parking areas related to court facilities.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court Security Committee shall meet regularly and shall report periodically to the Court on actions taken as well as recommendations for additional efforts to better assist the Court.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the following persons are appointed as members of the Court Security Committee, to serve until further order of the Court:

Hon. Richard Bevan, Chair  
5<sup>th</sup> District Administrative District Judge

Hon. Jay Gaskill  
District Judge, Nez Perce County

Hon. David Epis  
Magistrate Judge, Elmore County

Dan Chadwick  
Executive Director of Idaho Association of Counties

Roger Christiansen  
Bonneville County Commissioner

Captain Vern Hancock  
Operations Commander  
Idaho State Police

Christopher Rich  
Ada County Clerk

Angie Barkell  
Owyhee County Clerk

Dave Sanders  
Sheriff of Camas County

John Klauer  
Chief Bailiff / Judicial Security  
Canyon County

Holley Koole  
IPAA

Roland Gammill  
Director of Finance & Operations Division

Doug Tyler  
Third District Trial Court Administrator, Reporter


Sara Thomas  
Administrative Director of the Courts

Hon. Barry Wood  
Deputy Admin. Director of the Courts

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this order shall be effective the 28<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2016.

Dated this 28<sup>th</sup> of July, 2016.

By Order of the Supreme Court

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Jim Jones  
Chief Justice

ATTEST: Stephen Kenyon  
Steve Kenyon, Clerk

I, Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho, do hereby certify that the above is a true and correct copy of the Order entered in the above entitled cause and now on record in my office.  
WITNESS my hand and the Seal of this Court 7.28.16

Stephen Kenyon Clerk  
By: Jina D. Thomas Deputy

# In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho


IN RE: APPOINTMENT OF ) ORDER APPOINTING  
STATEWIDE COURT SECURITY ) SECURITY COMMITTEE  
COMMITTEE. ) No. 95-2

The Supreme Court has determined to appoint a Statewide Court Security Committee in recognition that minimum security requirements and guidelines for Idaho's courthouses should be established to assist court officials when working with local county officials to establish and maintain secure, accessible facilities. A poll of the Administrative District Judges reflected unanimous support for Supreme Court appointment of a security committee to develop proposals; therefore good cause appearing,

IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that a Supreme Court Statewide Security Committee be established,

IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the following are appointed to the Supreme Court Statewide Security Committee to recommend policies, procedures and guidelines to establish a statewide court security program, oversee a survey of all courthouses, assess risk, assist in development, implementation and coordination of court security plans, delineate the roles of law enforcement, county commissioners and the Judiciary to assure secure and accessible courthouses and court facilities for all citizens, court personnel, judges and others, and to evaluate and make recommendations to the Supreme Court regarding the role and qualifications of bailiffs, security devices and procedures, evacuation procedures, emergency situations and responses, high threat trials, and overall weapons policies:

Chief Justice Chas. F. McDevitt, Chair  
Hon. George R. Reinhardt  
Hon. Dennis E. Goff  
Hon. Roger Burdick  
Hon. Keith M. Walker  
Hon. Robert Burton




Hon. Michael McLaughlin  
Hon. Ronald Hart  
Dan Kessler  
Suzanne Johnson  
Russ Reneau  
Gary Peak  
Harold Lee  
Richard L. Cade  
Rose Gehring  
Betty Wilsey  
James H. Benham  
John Peay  
Patricia Tobias


IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the persons above appointed shall serve until further notice and shall meet at such times as necessary to complete the work of the Committee, with their expenses to be reimbursed by the Fiscal Office of the Courts.

DATED this 19<sup>th</sup> day of April, 1995, nunc pro tunc August 17, 1994.

By Order of the Supreme Court

  
Chas. F. McDevitt, Chief Justice

ATTEST:

  
Frederick C. Lyon, Clerk





# In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

IN RE: )  
COURT SECURITY COMMITTEE ) ORDER


The Court having received and reviewed the Report and recommendations of the Security Committee appointed by the Court,

NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That the Court does hereby approve and adopt the recommendations of the Court Security Committee appended hereto and made a part hereof.

The Administrative District Judges are hereby requested to appoint and organize County Facility Security Committees in each County in their Districts and implement the programs set forth in the appended Security Committee report.


It is hereby Ordered this 30th day of April, 1996.

By Order of the Supreme Court



Chas. F. McDevitt, Chief Justice


ATTEST:

  
Frederick C. Lyon, Clerk

I, Frederick C. Lyon, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho, do hereby certify that the above is a true and correct copy of the Order entered in the above entitled cause and now on record in my office.

WITNESS my hand and the Seal of this Court 4-31-96

FREDERICK C. LYON Clerk

  
Lois Dawson, Deputy Clerk



**SUPREME COURT SECURITY COMMITTEE**

**Chair: Chief Justice Chas F. McDevitt**

Hon. George R. Reinhardt, III  
District Judge

Hon. Michael McLaughlin  
Magistrate Judge

Dennis E. Goff  
Administrative Judge

Hon. Ronald Hart  
Magistrate Judge

Ms. Suzanne Johnson  
Asst. Trial Court Administrator

Ms. Rose E. Gehring, President  
County Commissioner's & Clerk's Assoc.

Mr. Russ Reneau, Chief Investigator  
Attorney General's Office

Ms. Betty Wilsey, President  
ID Assoc. of Recorders & Clerks

Mr. Gary Peek  
Ada County Marshal's Office

Mr. Jerry D. Bush  
Oneida County Commission

Hon. Roger Burdick  
District Judge

Hon. Keith M. Walker  
Magistrate Judge

Hon. Robert Burton  
Magistrate Judge

Dan Kessler  
Trial Court Administrator

Mr. Harold P. Lee  
President Sheriff's Associations

Mr. James H. Benham  
U.S. Marshal

Mr. Richard L. Cade, Past Director  
Department of Law Enforcement

John Peay, Assistant Director  
Idaho Supreme Court

Patricia Tobias, Administrative Director  
Idaho Supreme Court



# COURT FACILITY SECURITY

## ACTION PLAN

Prepared by:

Idaho Supreme Court Security Committee

1996

**SUPREME COURT SECURITY COMMITTEE**  
Chair: Chief Justice Chas F. McDevitt

Hon. George R. Reinhardt, III  
District Judge

Hon. Michael McLaughlin  
Magistrate Judge

Dennis E. Goff  
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President Sheriff's Associations

Mr. James H. Benham  
U.S. Marshal

Mr. Richard L. Cade, Past Director  
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Idaho Supreme Court

Patricia Tobias, Administrative Director  
Idaho Supreme Court

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## INTRODUCTION

Court facility security includes the procedures, technology, security personnel and architectural features needed to insure the protection of people and property within court facilities and nearby grounds to protect the integrity of government processes. It is of critical importance to detect, deter and limit damages and injuries of all people using court facilities.

In 1994, Chief Justice Chas. F. McDevitt appointed a broad-based committee to develop court facility security standards and procedures for Idaho. The committee approached this project recognizing that the proposed standards are broad, comprehensive statements which may have to be tailored to apply to the unique characteristics and situations of particular court facilities across the state. Idaho's court buildings are as varied, unique and diverse as the state itself. As a result, the application of security measures will require creativity, commitment and emphasis. While these security standards and tools are designed to enhance security in court facilities with courtrooms and court offices, county officials are invited to utilize these tools to enhance security in other county facilities.

Courthouses, for example, have increasingly become the focus of violence in our communities. There are a number of contributing factors including: the emotional and explosive contested issues in domestic and juvenile cases; the population growth occurring in Idaho; the rise of gangs and anarchist groups; the breakdown of respect for governmental authority of which the courthouse is a highly visible symbol; and the increased demand for the services which are rendered by offices within a courthouse.

In that setting, the committee began its work. Court Facility Security Standards were developed, followed by the development of a model Court Facility Security Audit form, a model Court Facility Emergency Response Plan and a recommended set of procedures for organizing public safety programs in court facilities. These tools are designed to maximize the safety of all users of local court facilities, i.e., litigants, jurors, private citizens, judges, elected officials and employees. However, these tools can only go so far. Without the commitment of local officials to implement the standards and develop a security plan, the ability of Idaho's citizens to conduct business with their court system, in a dignified and secure environment, will be compromised.

# COURT FACILITY SECURITY STANDARDS

## STANDARD 1

### LOCAL COURT FACILITY SECURITY COMMITTEE

The Administrative District Judge, or designee, shall appoint a Court Facility Security Committee for each county in the judicial district. Membership should include broad representation from those involved in the use of court facilities. The Trial Court Administrator shall be a member of each committee throughout the district.

#### Commentary

Security issues are not confined to the courts. Other public facilities can also be targets of violence. Additionally, each court facility is unique. Therefore, a local Court Facility Security Committee should address security issues in a cooperative and constructive manner. The Committee should review security standards, coordinate security audits and the implementation of facility security measures.

The local Court Facility Security Committee may include representatives from groups that utilize court facilities, such as law enforcement, the local bar and community groups. At a minimum each committee shall include a commissioner, sheriff, judge, district court clerk and district trial court administrator.

## STANDARD 2

### SECURITY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Written security policies and procedures governing security of court facilities should be prepared by each local Court Facility Security Committee to ensure consistent, appropriate and adequate security procedures. At a minimum, the manual should include: an emergency response plan that assigns responsibility for ordering evacuations, floor plans for the facility, routine security operations, a special operations plan for high risk trials or other extraordinary facility uses, a hostage situation response plan, and an emergency/evacuation response procedure (fire, bomb, disaster).

#### Commentary

A thorough knowledge of the Emergency Response Plan by all courthouse personnel should include the review of a security manual/video as a part of the orientation of new personnel and as a component of regular, continuing education for existing personnel.

A model Emergency Response Plan has been developed by the Idaho Supreme Court Security Committee and is available for use by the local Court Facility Security Committee as a resource which may be adapted to meet local needs.

## STANDARD 3

### PERSONS SUBJECT TO SECURITY SCREENING

All persons entering the courthouse should be subject to security screening. All screening should occur for each visit to the courthouse, during regular business hours, regardless of the purpose. After hour access to the courthouse should be limited and addressed by the local security committee.

#### Commentary

The credibility of courthouse security requires all persons to be subject to security screening. Any exemption of personnel from the screening process will unnecessarily degrade the security of the courthouse. Once exceptions are made, the opportunity for breaches of security increase. Persons refusing to be screened shall be denied access to the courthouse.

It is suggested that each courthouse have at least one portable walk-through magnetometer and a hand-held magnetometer, with personnel trained in the proper use of that equipment. Walk-through magnetometers at a single point of entry into the courthouse, with accompanying x-ray viewing of packages and handbags, is the optimal method of screening individuals entering a courthouse and should be utilized, except where impossible, to provide the type of security needed to ensure a safe environment.

## STANDARD 4

### COURT FACILITY SECURITY OFFICERS

Court facility security should be assigned to security officers or attendants who are specifically trained for this purpose.

#### Commentary

Facility security requires specialized training. Every effort should be made to provide training, either through the P.O.S.T. Academy, or by other individuals experienced in facility security.

Law enforcement officers who are present within the courthouse or other county facilities for other purposes should not be considered as a component of court facility security.

## STANDARD 5

### WEAPONS IN COURT FACILITIES

- A. No weapons shall be permitted in a court facility except those carried by court security officers or attendants, or as defined in Section C (below), provided that the facility has been installed with adequate security measures to ensure that no one will be armed with any weapon in the courthouse.
- B. In the event that weapons are permitted in a courthouse, a judge may ban weapons from the courthouse in those instances where enhanced security may be required.
- C. Each Court Facility Security Committee shall establish a local rule governing the carrying of weapons into the courthouse by law enforcement officers acting within the scope of their official duties.
- D. Law enforcement officers, court security officers or attendants, who appear in a judicial proceeding as a plaintiff, defendant, witness or interested party outside the scope of their official duties, shall not be permitted to bring weapons into the courthouse.

#### Commentary

There is no issue more controversial relating to courthouse security than whether law enforcement officers should be required to surrender their weapons at the courthouse door. Studies indicate that firearms in a courthouse increase, rather than diminish, the risk of security related problems.

Alternatively, it is almost universal law enforcement policy that every officer maintain a weapon as a part of their required daily equipment. It is recognized that law enforcement is equally concerned about courthouse security, including the prohibition of weapons from the courthouse.

Many acts of violence involving firearms occur in the courthouse when law enforcement or security officers are involved in litigation as a party and not in their official capacity. This litigation often involves extremely emotional domestic relations cases or where the officer has been a victim. Therefore, an exception (see Section D) is created for these circumstances.

## STANDARD 6

### PRISONER HANDLING WITHIN COURTHOUSE

- A. Where practicable, prisoners should be transported within the courthouse through areas which are not accessible to the public. Prisoners should be appropriately restrained with the use of belly chains and leg restraints. A prisoner should be kept in restraints during court proceedings, unless the judge gives specific permission to remove the restraints.
- B. Prisoners should be held in a secure holding area, equipped with video monitoring, where practicable, while awaiting court hearings and during any court recess. Physical and verbal contact with prisoners is prohibited, except for legal counsel or expert witnesses who are testifying on behalf of the prisoner. Attorney-client contact should occur in a secure holding area, which is not accessible to the public.
- C. Out-of-county law enforcement officers should contact local court security officers, prior to transporting a prisoner to another courthouse, to review local prisoner handling policies.
- D. If prisoners cannot be transported through courthouse facilities separated from the public, public movement in the transport area should be restricted during the time of prisoner transport.

#### Commentary

An estimated 70% of court related security problems occur during the transport of prisoners. Transport through a public area exposes the public to danger and enhances the possibility of prisoner escape.

Law enforcement officers should accompany prisoners to the courtroom and remain there during the court proceeding and then return the prisoner to a secure holding facility. Court security officers and attendants should not assume this responsibility.

## STANDARD 7

### DURESS ALARMS

All courtrooms, judges' chambers, public service counters and offices should be equipped with a duress alarm connected to a central security station. Duress alarms should be located on the judge's bench, at the work station of the in-court clerk, the secretary and at the public service counters throughout the court facility. The duress alarm system should be a system with an enunciation capability. All affected county personnel should be trained in the operation of and the response to the duress alarm.

#### Commentary

It is important that the duress alarm system be a type which includes an audible alarm at the central security station; however, the system should not include an audible alarm at the activation site. The duress alarm should quickly summon court security officers or additional help from the nearest law enforcement agency to the facility. Efforts should be made to standardize the location of duress alarms to allow judges, who have traveled into the county, to know where the alarm can be found on the bench or in chambers.

Testing of the duress alarm system should be done regularly so that confidence in the system is maintained.



## STANDARD 8

### CLOSED-CIRCUIT VIDEO SURVEILLANCE

When practicable, closed-circuit video surveillance should include the court building parking area, entrance to the building, lobby, courtroom(s) and all other public areas of the court facility.

#### Commentary

Public notification that public areas are under surveillance may dissuade those who have intentions of causing a disruption. Some court facilities may lack the architectural and structural elements necessary for security, and, therefore, require greater reliance on security devices. Close-circuit video surveillance is only as effective as the person assigned to monitor it. As a result, there must be an emphasis that such a system is secondary to security screening.

## **STANDARD 9**

### **RESTRICTED ACCESS TO OFFICES**

An effective secondary screening process at the entrance to the offices of judges and other areas deemed high risk, should be utilized to ensure safe and secure work areas and to protect against inappropriate interaction between judges and participants in the judicial process. Unless otherwise permitted, attorneys and other members of the public should not be permitted in areas of the courthouse that are used to house judges and office staff.

#### **Commentary**

Unlimited access to private offices and to clerical work areas is dangerous and unnecessary. The general public should not be permitted to wander through these departments for any reason. Persons having business with judges should be encouraged to make appointments.

Steps which may be taken to facilitate this standard include a central receptionist checkpoint, passive or active electromagnetic hall locks, card reader door locks or key pad entry systems.

The judges' chambers, as differentiated from the general staff offices, and parking spaces for judges should not be designated by marking the office or parking space with the title or name of the office holder.

## STANDARD 10

### AFTER HOURS SECURITY

As a part of a comprehensive security plan, each Court Facility Security Committee, in conjunction with local law enforcement personnel, should develop and adopt procedures to provide security to judges and courthouse personnel who have received threats as a consequence of their official duties, for periods of time other than normal working hours.

#### Commentary

The protection of judges and county personnel from work-related threats and acts of violence outside their usual work hours is important. It is essential that a plan be in place to respond to such incidents.

The protection plans should consider personal security profiles, residential alarm systems, extra police patrols, cellular telephones, weapons training, self-defense training and a personal/family bodyguard. While all of these steps include some financial commitment, the plan may be tailored to respond to the needs of any given situation.

## **STANDARD 11**

### **STRUCTURAL DESIGN OF COURT FACILITIES**

All architectural designs for new construction or remodeling of court facilities shall be reviewed by the local Court Facility Security Committee to ensure that the new or remodeled facility incorporates sufficient security related elements. Model courthouse architectural designs are available through the American Institute of Architects and the National Center for State Courts.

#### **Commentary**

Future court facility design must include design elements to separate the general public from judges and court personnel. The secure movement of prisoners to courtrooms and holding cells must be taken into consideration. Public facility design requires special planning to ensure security for the tenants of the facility as well as those members of the public who conduct business there.

## STANDARD 12

### INCIDENT REPORTING

- A. Every security threat or act that occurs within a court facility or against a judge outside the courthouse, shall be reported to local law enforcement.
- B. Additionally, every security threat that is received by a judge shall be reported to designated personnel at the Supreme Court. Supreme Court personnel shall then report the threat to the Investigations Bureau of the Department of Law Enforcement. The Supreme Court shall tabulate the number of threats made against judges.
- C. Each county should adopt a policy for reporting security incidents and include that policy in the Emergency Response Plan.

#### Commentary

To measure the security of local court facilities, it is critical that all security threats be reported to local law enforcement.

## **RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR ORGANIZING PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAMS IN COURT FACILITIES**

The following is a recommended procedure for organizing a local court facility security program. What follows is a list of recommended steps that can be undertaken at little or no cost:

- Step 1: Organize a Court Facility Security Committee
- Step 2: Identify Court Facility Security Coordinator
- Step 3: Conduct a Court Facility Security Audit
- Step 4: Develop a Court Facility Emergency Response Plan
- Step 5: Develop Employee Security Training Programs
- Step 6: Develop a Courthouse Weapons Policy
- Step 7: Identify Potential Funding Sources

## STEP 1

### ORGANIZE A COURT FACILITY SECURITY COMMITTEE

The purpose of the Court Facility Security Committee is to coordinate the development of a local court facility security program. The Committee should meet at least quarterly to participate in court facility security audits, assess risks, recommend responses to the security risks and develop pertinent policies. The urgency of planning and implementing security programs may dictate more frequent meetings. The Committee should be guided by the Court Facility Security Standards as it develops its local court facility security program. Standard 1 of the Court Facility Security Standards recommends who should organize the committee as well as its composition.

## STEP 2

### IDENTIFY A COURT FACILITY SECURITY COORDINATOR

The Court Facility Security Committee should identify a person who will be responsible for promoting and monitoring local court facility security. Depending on the county, this individual might be a court bailiff, marshal or the sheriff. This person shall participate in planning and implementing the court facility security plan. As local circumstances dictate, this person may supervise other court security personnel. Additionally, this person should participate in the court facility security audit and be charged with coordinating resolution of any identified deficiencies. In the event of a security related incident, this person should be the central point of contact for responding law enforcement agencies.

### STEP 3

#### CONDUCT A COURT FACILITY SECURITY AUDIT

A model Court Facility Security Audit instrument has been developed to help local Court Facility Security Committees assess potential security risks in local facilities. Due to the wide variety of court facilities throughout the state of Idaho, this survey instrument may need to be modified to respond to local circumstances.

The local Court Facility Security Committee shall appoint a survey team consisting of representatives of the Committee, the local Court Facility Security Coordinator and the District Trial Court Administrator. The Trial Court Administrator offers unique insight by his or her familiarity with other courthouses and may observe security risks that may not be obvious to team members who reside in the facility being audited.

When resources allow, outside experts in facility security should be employed to survey court facility security. State resources may become available to hire consultants to assess courthouse security on a statewide basis. The availability of such state resources is dependent on legislative appropriations. As a result, the local Court Facility Security Committee should go ahead with its own audit and any future outside assessments would then serve to augment local efforts.

Each security related problem should be recorded and detailed in a report to the Court Facility Security Committee. These problems should then be prioritized by ease of correction as well as the resources that would be required to correct the problem. For example, implementing a comprehensive key control system is less expensive than installing a closed circuit surveillance system.

Policy changes to enhance security may have no cost at all. For example, introducing a personnel policy that requires an employee, who has obtained a domestic violence protection order, to report that situation to his or her department supervisor, is an important step that has no fiscal impact.

An annual facility security audit should be completed to evaluate the progress that has been made in enhancing court facility security.



## STEP 4

### DEVELOP A COURT FACILITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN

A Model Court Facility Emergency Response Plan has been developed to assist local Court Facility Security Committees. The Model Plan identifies emergencies that may occur in or around a facility and generally accepted response procedures. The local Court Facility Security Committee may wish to add or delete elements to the Emergency Response Plan to reflect local circumstances. Portions of this document should be provided to courthouse employees as part of a court security training program. It is of particular importance that appropriate response steps be posted at critical locations within the court facility for quick reference.

## STEP 5

### DEVELOP EMPLOYEE SECURITY TRAINING PROGRAMS

Good facility security requires some sacrifice by all who share in its benefits. A good security program can exist only in an environment of constant concern and awareness. Repetitive employee orientation and staff training programs must emphasize good security practices and expectations. The first objective in having an effective security program is:

**Get everyone thinking security!**

If department supervisors or judges fail to adopt a security consciousness, it is unlikely that court employees will place any priority on security. The appropriate sections of the Emergency Response Plan for the court must be provided to each employee. The Court Facility Security Coordinator should conduct security training seminars for all employees at the start of the new security program and periodically, as directed by the Court Facility Security Committee. All new employees, as a part of their new employees' orientation, should be provided with security training.

## STEP 6

### DEVELOP A COURTHOUSE WEAPONS POLICY

Standard 5 section (B) of the Court Facility Security Standards states: "Each Court Facility Security Committee shall recommend a local rule governing the carrying of weapons into the courthouse by law enforcement officers acting within the scope of their official duties." Local policies, perceptions and traditions will influence the rule governing weapons in the courthouse.

The Court Facility Security Committee may wish to use Standard 5 as a beginning point in developing a weapons policy. Any rule governing the use of weapons must be provided to all local law enforcement agencies to avoid any confusion at the court facility. Failure to comply with the weapons rule should be grounds for denying access to the facility.

## STEP 7

### IDENTIFY POTENTIAL FUNDING SOURCES

Certain security enhancements may require the purchase of security related equipment or the hiring of personnel. There are potential sources of funding that a county might wish to consider to use to pay for security enhancements. The following is a list of potential funding sources:

1. Establish a new local fund designated to facility security, funded by restitution payments.
2. Examine legislation allowing funds in the interlock fund to be used to fund security measures.
3. Consider the funding options outlined in I.C. § 31-1002 and I.C. § 31-1008 to generate funds to upgrade security in court facilities.
4. Establish reimbursement to the county by telephone companies for pay phones in use within county facilities.
5. Explore the centralized acquisition of security equipment to obtain an economy of scale should be utilized to the extent possible.

# COURT FACILITY SECURITY AUDIT

COUNTY NAME:

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NAME OF PERSON(S)  
COMPLETING AUDIT:

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DATE AUDIT  
COMPLETED:

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## CHECK LIST OF ATTACHMENTS:


- Completed Audit Form
- Floor Plans of Court Facility
- Photograph of Court Facility
- Other
- Job Descriptions




## INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION

Court facility security includes procedures, technology, security personnel and architectural features needed to insure the protection of people and property within court facilities and nearby grounds to protect the integrity of government processes.

This Court Facility Security Audit has been designed to assist each Court Facility Security Committee in identifying areas within court facilities where efforts should be focused to reduce security risks. Because of the varied nature of court facilities throughout the state of Idaho, it is difficult to design a security audit form that will identify all possible security problems.



The questions in this audit have been designed so that if the answer to a question is "NO", that is an area where the Security Committee should focus its attention. If the county has multiple court facilities, a separate audit should be completed for each building location. The audit shall be completed by a team designated by the Court Facility Security Committee. A new audit should be completed annually to provide the Committee with the ability to assess progress in enhancing security.



The completed audit form should be treated as extremely confidential, only to be shared with those appointed to the Court Facility Security Committee. In no way should the results of the audit be viewed as a criticism of past practices. Rather, the audit is intended to serve as the springboard to enhance the security of court facilities throughout the state.

**A. GENERAL INFORMATION:**

1. Please complete the following information regarding the offices housed in this facility.

<u>Name of Organization/Agency Occupying Building and Floor</u>	<u>Number of Persons Employed</u>	<u>Regular Work Hours</u>
---	---------------------------------------	-------------------------------

Example: County Treasurer/1st Floor	4	9AM-5PM (5 days a week)
--	---	----------------------------

_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

Add pages as required. ,

2. The building is constructed of: Brick [ ]; Concrete [ ]; Wood [ ];  
or other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_
3. How many public \_\_\_\_\_ and private (key access) \_\_\_\_\_  
entrances are there to the facility?

**B. GENERAL FACILITY INFORMATION:**

1. Facility
- a. Separate (reserved) parking is provided for:
- [ ] elected officials
  - [ ] judges
  - [ ] employees
  - [ ] witnesses and/or jurors
  - [ ] other building users

- b. Are the reserved spaces unmarked by name or title? Yes  No
- c. Is the parking area sufficiently lighted to discourage attacks against persons or vehicles? Yes  No
- d. Is the parking area routinely patrolled? If yes, by whom and how often? Yes  No
- 
- e. Are entrances and windows to the facility routinely checked, during non-working hours, for security violations? Yes  No
- f. Are all exterior doors equipped with cylinder locks, dead bolts, or other quality locks? Yes  No
- g. Are all exterior doors equipped with intrusion alarms? Yes  No
- h. Are all operable windows equipped with locks? Yes  No
- i. Are windows on the ground floor made of tempered glass or ballistic plastic? Yes  No
- j. Are the hinge pins on all external doors located internally or otherwise treated to prevent removal? Yes  No
- k. Are the number of doors to the outdoors reduced to the minimum necessary? Yes  No
- l. Do roof openings have intrusion alarms? Yes  No
- m. Is a key-control system in effect for the building? Yes  No
- n. Is there a current listing of all key holders? Yes  No

- o. Do county employees enter through the same entrance as other facility users? Yes [ ] No [ ]
- p. Are drop or removable ceilings used in the building or adjacent corridors or offices? Yes [ ] No [ ]
- q. Are court offices locked after hours? Yes [ ] No [ ]

2. Landscaping

- a. Do landscape features prevent places for potential intruders to hide or bombs to be hidden? Yes [ ] No [ ]
- b. Have all items such as bricks, stones or fence pickets which could be used by intruders as weapons, missiles or tools, been removed? Yes [ ] No [ ]

3. Electrical

- a. Are the main electrical power sources for the building secured? Yes [ ] No [ ]
- b. Does an auxiliary power source or light system exist for the building? Yes [ ] No [ ]
- c. Is the auxiliary power system periodically checked? Yes [ ] No [ ]

4. Alarms

- a. Does this facility have one or multiple intrusion alarms? (If yes, specify type and number of sensors.) Yes [ ] No [ ] \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Who responds to an alarm signal? \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Estimated response time: \_\_\_\_\_



- c. Do all court offices have duress alarms? Yes [ ] No [ ]  
(If yes, specify number and location) \_\_\_\_\_
- d. Does the alarm pinpoint the location of the problem? Yes [ ] No [ ]
- e. Are all alarm systems covered by a service or maintenance agreement? Yes [ ] No [ ]  
Who provides the service? \_\_\_\_\_
- f. Is there an emergency power source for the alarm? Yes [ ] No [ ]
- g. Is the alarm system tested regularly? Yes [ ] No [ ]  
How often and by whom? \_\_\_\_\_

5. Safe/Vaults

- a. Are critical records kept in vault(s) or fireproof cabinet(s)? Yes [ ] No [ ]
- b. Are the vaults equipped with fire and intrusion alarms? Yes [ ] No [ ]

6. Fire Protection

- a. Are sprinkler or other fire retardant systems installed in this facility? Yes [ ] No [ ]
- b. Are records areas equipped with a fire alarm? Yes [ ] No [ ]
- c. Is the building annually inspected by the fire department? Yes [ ] No [ ]

c. When was the building last inspected by the fire department? \_\_\_\_\_

d. List any fire hazards \_\_\_\_\_

7. Restricted Storage Areas

a. Are the following items stored in a restricted area?

Firearms	Yes [ ]	No [ ]
Ammunition	Yes [ ]	No [ ]
Flammable materials	Yes [ ]	No [ ]
Evidence	Yes [ ]	No [ ]
Physiological materials	Yes [ ]	No [ ]
Hazardous materials	Yes [ ]	No [ ]

b. Who has responsibility for management of the restricted area? \_\_\_\_\_

c. Is there an established procedure regarding the movement of evidence? Yes [ ] No [ ]

d. Are there procedures to limit ingress or egress to the restricted storage area? Yes [ ] No [ ]

e. Is the evidence storage area protected by an alarm? Yes [ ] No [ ]

f. Is evidence stored in: Safe [ ], Locked Cabinet [ ], Vault [ ], or other location (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

g. Is the evidence storage area well ventilated? Yes [ ] No [ ]

h. Is the evidence storage area routinely inspected during security patrols? Yes [ ] No [ ]

i. Are large amounts of cash left in the facility overnight? Yes [ ] No [ ]  
If yes, why \_\_\_\_\_

8. Restricted Areas

- a. Are there restricted areas within the building? (Judicial corridors, clerks office, jury deliberation rooms, and private offices.) Specify:

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- b. Are the restricted areas sufficiently secure to prevent unauthorized entry? Yes [ ] No [ ]

- c. Is a restricted area provided to petitioners seeking domestic violence protective orders? Yes [ ] No [ ]

9. Public Areas (Waiting Areas, Restrooms, Trash Receptacles and Hallways)

- a. Are public areas routinely searched? Yes [ ] No [ ]  
How often and by whom? \_\_\_\_\_

- b. Have drop or removable ceilings been eliminated in public areas? Yes [ ] No [ ]

- c. Are public counters designed to preclude a person from reaching over the counter and coming in contact with staff or materials on desks? Yes [ ] No [ ]

- d. Is access to clerical space separated from public areas by a locked door or gate? Yes [ ] No [ ]

10. Security Personnel

- a. Are constant and on-site security personnel present during working hours (hours open to the public)? Yes [ ] No [ ]

- b. Are constant and on-site security personnel present after normal working hours (juries and staff working after hours)? Yes [ ] No [ ]

- c. Do current written job descriptions and qualifications exist for all security positions? Yes  No   
(Attach examples)
- d. Is on-going training mandatory for security officers? Yes  No
- e. Is an updated security officers' manual available? Yes  No
- f. Who provides security during non-working hour? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
- g. Are court security officers armed with: Firearms , Mace ,  
Handcuffs , Baton , Other. Specify \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
- h. Do security personnel have powers of arrest? Yes  No   
Under whose jurisdiction are they sworn? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
- i. Who provides training for security officers and how often? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
- j. Do security personnel have: Two-Way Radios , Pagers ,  
Other Communication Devices ? Specify \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

11. Detention

- a. Is the Sheriff responsible for the security of in-custody persons while they are in the courthouse? Yes  No
- b. Does the court facility have temporary holding cell(s) or room(s) for in-custody persons awaiting court appearance? Yes  No   
If so, how many? \_\_\_\_\_
- c. How is the door to the holding area secured?  
Key Lock  Electrically  Manually
- d. Are female security officers available? Yes  No

- e. Does the circulation path from the detention area to the courtroom prevent contact with court staff? Yes  No
- f. Does the circulation path from the detention area to the courtroom prevent contact with the public? Yes  No
- g. If no, are public areas evacuated while the in-custody persons are being transported? Yes  No
- h. Are security officers who have direct contact with in-custody persons prohibited from wearing firearms? Yes  No
- I. Are in-custody persons adequately restrained while in the courthouse? Yes  No
- j. Are in-custody persons prohibited from having contact with anyone except legal counsel? Yes  No
- k. Does attorney-client contact occur in a secured holding cell or controlled room? Yes  No

12. Judicial Chambers

- a. Are the following items included in the Judicial Chambers Security System:
  - 1. Duress alarm (judge's desk) Yes  No
  - 2. Entry control (electric strike lock) closed circuit capability to identify persons wishing access? Yes  No
- b. Are duress alarms placed in a standardized, concealed location at the judges' desk and clerk's desk? Yes  No
- c. List the number of entrances to the chambers area \_\_\_\_\_.

- d. How many of these entrances are secured (locked) at all times? \_\_\_\_\_.
- e. Is the corridor leading to the chambers a restricted access area? Yes [ ] No [ ]
- f. Is the location of judges' chambers unmarked by name or title? Yes [ ] No [ ]

13. Courtroom (Evaluate each courtroom separately)

- a. Does the courtroom have the following security items?
  - 1. Duress alarm (judge's bench) Yes [ ] No [ ]
  - 2. Duress alarm (clerk's station) Yes [ ] No [ ]
  - 3. Are duress alarms placed in a standardized concealed location at the judges' bench and clerk's desk? Yes [ ] No [ ]
  - 4. Emergency lighting (focused away from the bench) Yes [ ] No [ ]
  - 5. Is the emergency lighting system periodically checked? Yes [ ] No [ ]
  - 6. Are light switches located in a secure area not accessible to the public? Yes [ ] No [ ]
  - If no, are they key operated switches? Yes [ ] No [ ]
  - 7. Is bench armor in place? Yes [ ] No [ ]
  - 8. Is the bench closed at both ends to restrict access from the well? Yes [ ] No [ ]
  - 9. Is the well separated from the public? Yes [ ] No [ ]
  - 10. Are the defendant's chair and the witness chairs built to allow the use of restraints? Yes [ ] No [ ]

- 11. Are spectator seats solidly built and fastened to the floor? Yes [ ] No [ ]
- 12. Are potential weapons, such as drinking glasses, water pitchers, and name plates kept out of the parties' reach? Yes [ ] No [ ]
- 13. Does the courtroom have a telephone? Yes [ ] No [ ]
- 14. Is the layout of the courtroom furniture designed to minimize the in-custody person's contact with court personnel, attorneys, witnesses and jurors? Yes [ ] No [ ]
- 15. Is there outside visual inspection capability by emergency personnel? Yes [ ] No [ ]

c. Are all exterior windows draped or tinted to obscure vision from the outside? Yes [ ] No [ ]

b. How many entrances and exits does the courtroom have? \_\_\_\_\_

1. How many are private entrances? \_\_\_\_\_

2. How many are public entrances? \_\_\_\_\_

3. Is there a private secure route from judicial chambers to the courtroom? Yes [ ] No [ ]

d. Is the courtroom locked when not in use? Yes [ ] No [ ]

e. Are persons entering the courtroom area required to pass through a metal detector? Yes [ ] No [ ]

f. Is needed security provided to witnesses by trained personnel? Yes [ ] No [ ]  
By whom? \_\_\_\_\_

g. Is needed security provided to jurors by trained personnel? Yes [ ] No [ ]  
By whom? \_\_\_\_\_

- h. Is the courtroom routinely searched before and after use? Yes  No
- I. Are the areas restricted where contraband can be stored that would be available to non-court personnel (drawers, waste receptacles)? Yes  No

14. Public Meeting Rooms

- a. Does the meeting room have the following security items?
  - 1. Duress alarm Yes  No
  - 2. Emergency lighting Yes  No
  - 3. Are light switches located in a secure area not accessible to the public? Yes  No   
 If no, are they key operated switches? Yes  No
  - 4. Are potential weapons, such as drinking glasses, water pitchers, and name plates kept out of the public's reach? Yes  No
- b. How many entrances and exits does the meeting room have? \_\_\_\_\_
  - 1. How many are private entrances? \_\_\_\_\_
  - 2. How many are public entrances? \_\_\_\_\_
  - 3. Is there a private secure route from private offices to the meeting room? Yes  No
- c. Is security provided during meetings held after normal working hours? Yes  No
- d. Has the room been marked for capacity by the fire department? Yes  No



15. General

- a. Is the courtroom or other court space used only by court personnel? Yes [ ] No [ ]
- If no, is the courtroom searched afterward? Yes [ ] No [ ]
- b. Are jail trustees denied unsupervised access to courthouse facilities? Yes [ ] No [ ]
- c. Are new employees provided orientation on court facility security? Yes [ ] No [ ]
- d. Are janitorial services provided in the facility during normal working hours? Yes [ ] No [ ]
- e. Are security background checks completed on individuals providing janitorial services? Yes [ ] No [ ]
- f. Are janitors denied unsupervised access to all restricted areas? Yes [ ] No [ ]
- g. Describe any security problems (such as the following) which have occurred in the past five years - stating why you believe the situation occurred and what could be done to prevent future problems.

Escape  
Disorderly Conduct  
- In Court  
- Out of Court  
Assault on Court Personnel  
Threats (Bomb, Violence)  
Demonstrations  
Theft  
Fire  
Witness Intimidation  
Other

- h. Does this court facility currently have specific security plans for:
- |                         |                              |                             |
|-------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Bomb Threats            | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Hostage Situations      | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> |
| High Risk Trials        | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Witness Intimidation    | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Fire or Other Emergency | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> |
- I. Does the county maintain emergency medial information on elected officials, employees and and judges? Yes  No
- j. Does the county have a mail screening process designed to identify suspicious letters or parcels? Yes  No
- k. Is the Security Plan and Security Audit kept confidential? Yes  No

(Attach copies)

MODEL  
COURT FACILITY EMERGENCY  
RESPONSE PLAN

for

\_\_\_\_\_ COUNTY  
\_\_\_\_\_, IDAHO

# EMERGENCY DATA SHEET

## 1. Primary Courthouse Facility Personnel:

	Name	Home Phone	Bus. Phone
Chairman, County Commission:	_____	__ - ____	__ - ____
County Commissioner:	_____	__ - ____	__ - ____
County Commissioner:	_____	__ - ____	__ - ____
District Judge:	_____	__ - ____	__ - ____
Magistrate Judge(s):	_____	__ - ____	__ - ____
	_____	__ - ____	__ - ____
District Court Clerk:	_____	__ - ____	__ - ____
Assessor:	_____	__ - ____	__ - ____
Treasurer	_____	__ - ____	__ - ____
Prosecuting Attorney:	_____	__ - ____	__ - ____
Sheriff:	_____	__ - ____	__ - ____
Coroner:	_____	__ - ____	__ - ____

## 2. Responding Agencies:

a.	Law Enforcement:	_____ Sheriff	__ - ____	__ - ____
		_____ City Police	__ - ____	__ - ____
b.	Fire Control:	_____ Fire Dept.	__ - ____	__ - ____
c.	Emergency Medical:	_____ Hospital	__ - ____	__ - ____

COURT FACILITY SECURITY COMMITTEE

for

\_\_\_\_\_ COUNTY

NAME \_\_\_\_\_ TITLE \_\_\_\_\_ LOCATION \_\_\_\_\_ PHONE \_\_\_\_\_

CHAIR:

MEMBERS:

## USE OF AND ACCESS TO COURT FACILITY

1. This court facility is open to employees from \_\_\_\_\_ a.m. to \_\_\_\_\_ p.m. each business day.
2. The public has access to this court facility from \_\_\_\_\_ a.m. to \_\_\_\_\_ p.m. each business day.
3. Access by employees to this facility before or after the hours listed above is discouraged. If such access is required, the employee must sign in on the access ledger and assumes responsibility for securing the facility after he or she departs.
4. Public utilization of court facilities during non-business hours must be approved by the person designated for building scheduling by the Court Facility Security Committee. The building must be closed by a person designated by the Court Facility Security Committee to insure that the building is properly locked and that no materials have been left behind after public use.
5. All employees should immediately report to appropriate law enforcement agencies and their department head any safety hazard, security violation, vandalism or suspicious circumstances in or around the facility. All such events shall be investigated and a report of the event and the resultant investigation shall be provided to the Chair of the Court Facility Security Committee, Risk Manager and District Trial Court Administrator.
6. Keys or access cards to court facilities are provided new employees on their first day, and only after they sign a receipt acknowledging the receipt of the key or access card. Employees leaving their job must return their key or access card before they receive their final paycheck from the county or state.
7. Employees who lose their key or access card must notify their department head immediately, who will then notify the person charged with key control.
8. Periodic re-keying, and the changing of combinations should be completed.

## FIRE OR SMOKE IN BUILDING

Upon discovery of smoke or fire in the court facility:

1. Activate nearest fire alarm.
2. Call Fire Department at \_\_\_\_\_.

Once fire alarm sounds:

1. All personnel shall close, but not lock, doors and windows in their work areas and evacuate the building.
2. Department heads shall insure that all staff and public in their immediate office area evacuate the building.

Upon evacuation from the building:

1. Employees shall meet at a pre-arranged meeting place, at least 300 feet from the facility and report to their department head.
2. Employees shall stay out of the way of emergency personnel and return to the facility only when instructed to do so.

Each Court Facility Security Committee should develop a mechanism to notify facility occupants when it is appropriate to return to work.

## EXPLOSIONS

In the event of an explosion in or around a court facility:

1. Activate nearest fire alarm.
2. Call Fire Department at \_\_\_\_\_.

Once fire alarm sounds:

1. Evacuate the building.
2. Department heads shall insure that all staff and public in their immediate office area evacuate the building.

Upon evacuation from the building:

1. Employees shall meet at a pre-arranged meeting place, at least 300 feet from the facility and report to their department head.
2. Cooperate with public safety personnel on the scene.
3. As soon as practicable, record their recollection of events, individuals and circumstances they observed immediately preceding the explosion. This information may be of assistance to officials investigating the event.

Each Court Facility Security Committee should develop a mechanism to notify facility occupants when it is appropriate to return to work.



## DEMONSTRATION OR DISTURBANCE OUTSIDE A COURT FACILITY

In the event that there is a demonstration or disturbance outside of a court facility that poses a threat to the occupants of the building:

1. Call law enforcement at \_\_\_\_\_
2. Notify the person in charge of facility security.
3. Lock all doors to the building. Access to the building during such an event should be limited to employees and law enforcement personnel.
4. Employees should go to their offices and lock the doors and close drapes.
5. Employees shall remain in the building or should evacuate the facility as directed by responding law enforcement personnel.
6. Department heads should remain in contact with each other during the course of the event.
7. Use of phones should be limited to vital need.
8. Written reports of the event should be obtained as soon as possible to assist law enforcement investigation of the event.

## BOMB THREAT

As an employee of a government agency you may at some time receive a telephone bomb threat. People usually call in bomb threats for one of two main reasons:

1. The caller may have definite knowledge of or believes that an explosive device has been or will be placed and wants to minimize personal or property damage. The caller may be the person who placed the device or someone else who has become aware of such information.
2. The caller wants to create an atmosphere of anxiety and panic which will, in turn, disrupt the normal activities of the place where the device is purportedly located.

For a number of years, the majority of bomb threats were simply threats, however, in the last few years, the number of actual attempts has increased dramatically. The immediate response to a bomb threat may limit the extent of damage that results and, in many cases, may prompt the arrest of the person setting the device or making the false report.

In the event that you receive a telephone bomb threat:

1. Keep the caller on the line as long as possible.
2. If possible, record the phone call.
3. Complete the BOMB THREAT checklist, a copy of which is attached, and provide the completed checklist to law enforcement upon arrival.  
A BOMB THREAT checklist form should be available at each office phone location in the building.
4. Call law enforcement at \_\_\_\_\_.
5. Notify the person in charge of facility security.

If a search for an explosive device is ordered, there are three levels of search that will be required:

1. **Employee Search.** The search of the immediate work areas by employees is often the most efficient search. Only employees will know what belongs where and what is out of place, unusual or strange. Their search efforts should extend to common areas used for storage and normal access/egress. If strange or unusual items are identified, they should be reported to law enforcement immediately and **should not be touched**. Daily examination of his or her immediate work area should be completed by each employee.

PLACE THIS UNDER YOUR TELEPHONE

PLACE THIS UNDER YOUR TELEPHONE

QUESTIONS TO ASK:

1. WHEN IS BOMB GOING TO EXPLODE?
2. WHERE IS IT RIGHT NOW?
3. WHAT DOES IT LOOK LIKE?
4. WHAT KIND OF BOMB IS IT?
5. WHAT WILL CAUSE IT TO EXPLODE?
6. DID YOU PLACE THE BOMB?
7. WHY?
8. WHAT IS YOUR ADDRESS?
9. WHAT IS YOUR NAME

QUESTIONS TO ASK:

1. WHEN IS BOMB GOING TO EXPLODE?
2. WHERE IS IT RIGHT NOW?
3. WHAT DOES IT LOOK LIKE?
4. WHAT KIND OF BOMB IS IT?
5. WHAT WILL CAUSE IT TO EXPLODE?
6. DID YOU PLACE THE BOMB?
7. WHY?
8. WHAT IS YOUR ADDRESS?
9. WHAT IS YOUR NAME

EXACT WORDING OF THE THREAT:

EXACT WORDING OF THE THREAT:

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SEX OF CALLER: \_\_\_\_\_ RACE: \_\_\_\_\_

SEX OF CALLER: \_\_\_\_\_ RACE: \_\_\_\_\_

AGE: \_\_\_\_\_ LENGTH OF CALL: \_\_\_\_\_

AGE: \_\_\_\_\_ LENGTH OF CALL: \_\_\_\_\_

NUMBER AT WHICH CALL IS RECEIVED:

NUMBER AT WHICH CALL IS RECEIVED:

TIME: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_

TIME: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_

**BOMB THREAT**

**BOMB THREAT**

(OVER)

(OVER)

## MEDICAL EMERGENCIES

In case of a serious injury or in the event of a medical emergency:

1. Call for medical assistance at : \_\_\_\_\_
2. Give clear instructions as to where the individual is located.
3. Stay on the phone with the dispatcher, providing as much information about the situation as possible.
4. Notify Facility Security Coordinator.
5. Any immediate medical assistance provided to the injured person should be provided within the limits of the staff person providing it.
6. Check for any "Medic Alert" tags or bracelets. If they are located, notify the dispatcher. If the injured person is an employee, obtain the biographical/notification information from that individual's personnel file for reference.
7. Keep the injured person calm and as comfortable as possible.
8. Do not move the injured person.
9. Make an attempt to protect the injured persons personal effects. They should be turned over to law enforcement or emergency medical personnel.
10. Keep unnecessary people away.
11. As soon as possible, after the person has been treated or has left with emergency medical personnel, write down what you know about the incident. Provide this information to your department head.

## THEFT, BURGLARY, DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY

In the event that you determine that there has been a burglary, destruction of property in or around the court facility or you have had items stolen:

1. If the incident is observed from the exterior of the building, do not enter the building.  
  
If you discover the burglary after entering the building, do not touch anything and leave immediately.
2. Notify law enforcement.
3. Notify the Facility Safety Coordinator.
4. If you feel the burglar is still in the building, exit the building, use the duress alarm or call law enforcement at \_\_\_\_\_.
5. Do not let non-law enforcement personnel enter the area.
6. Notify your department head.
7. Immediately record all your observations about the incident, focusing particular attention on individuals or situations out of the ordinary. Provide this written report to your department head and law enforcement.

## DISTURBANCE AT FRONT COUNTER/RECEPTION AREA

In the event that a person at the front counter or in a reception area displays behavior that you perceive as threatening:

1. Press duress alarm, if available.  
If no duress alarm is available, call law enforcement at: \_\_\_\_\_
2. Remain calm; if a demand for money is made, give it to them.
3. Try to calm the individual. Tell the person that you will need help to solve the problem.
4. Close the door leading to your work area.
5. Take cover if necessary or evacuate the work area.
6. Remain in office area until advised that the situation is under control by the proper authorities.
7. All witnesses should prepare a written report to the department head and to law enforcement.

## HIGH PROFILE (THREAT) TRIALS

It is the responsibility of court personnel to notify local law enforcement when it is believed that extra courthouse security is needed due to a high profile court case. Law enforcement, in consultation with the court, shall determine the level of security necessary by evaluating the following:

1. What type of case is before the court. Is it a civil or criminal case?
2. Do special interest groups have an interest in the case?
3. Is this a highly sensationalized case, are emotions charged or has public sentiment peaked?
4. Does the defendant have a prior history of aggressive/hostile acts?
5. Has bail been denied or revoked because of the serious nature of the crime?
6. Could the presence of family members and friends of the victim or defendant at the court hearing present a significant cause for concern?
7. Have threats been made on the lives of any of the participants in the court proceeding (judge, court staff, witnesses, attorneys, defendant)?
8. Does the case involve any contentious child custody, domestic violence or family relations issues?
9. Are multiple defendants involved in the case?

If it is determined that a specific court case poses a high risk, the following steps are recommended:

1. Have a security plan in place for the case in question.
2. Establish a search procedure.
  - a. Courtrooms are to remain locked when not in use.
  - b. Searches of the courtroom shall be made before the courtroom is opened.

- c. Put the courtroom under constant surveillance during recesses.
  - d. Set up daily search procedures for all areas the defendant is expected to occupy.
  - e. Established procedures to ensure that in-custody defendants and other defendants are separated from each other.
3. Test duress alarm systems on a daily basis, before the hearing begins.
  4. Establish a search/screen operation to control spectator entry, utilizing hand-held magnetometers or walk through magnetometers, if available. All baggage and newspapers should be searched before allowing into courtroom.
  5. Assign spectator seating and separate potentially troublesome individuals or groups. Do not tolerate standing in spectator areas nor movement from assigned seats.
  6. Consider placing plainclothes security officers in the spectator section.
  7. Station uniformed security personnel outside courtroom.
  8. Reserve the front row of spectator seating for the press, to place a buffer between the spectators, the courtroom well and the bench.
  9. Evaluate the need for restraints and employ upon judicial approval.
  10. Allow no contact between defendant and spectators.
  11. Contact between defendants must be controlled.

Court staff, the assigned judge and law enforcement personnel should meet regularly, during the course of the high profile case, to review security measures, press relations, what items are provided to the defendant in the courtroom and to adjust those measures accordingly.



## HOSTAGE SITUATION

In the event that YOU are taken as a hostage:

1. Comply with requests, but do not be overly cooperative.
4. Remember, efforts are being made to gain your release, even if you do not see or hear anything.
5. Do not volunteer to do anything for the hostage taker.
6. You owe no allegiance to the hostage taker; if you can escape, do so.
7. If law enforcement attempts a rescue, hit the floor and stay on the floor.
8. Unless instructed to do so by law enforcement, do not evacuate the room.

It is important to remember that the more time that passes, the greater the possibility of a successful resolution to the hostage situation.

In the event that you become aware of a hostage being taken captive:

1. Contact law enforcement at: \_\_\_\_\_
2. Become a good witness; be observant making mental notes.
3. Evacuate the area of any bystanders.
4. Provide assistance to law enforcement as requested.

## ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY

In the event that there is an escape by an in-custody defendant in the courthouse:

1. Call law enforcement immediately at \_\_\_\_\_ and/or press the duress alarm.
2. Do not attempt to interfere with the escape. The escapee will be pursued by law enforcement.
3. The person notifying law enforcement should provide as much information as is available, name of the escapee, description, direction and mode of travel of escape and descriptions of any persons assisting in the escape.
4. Any staff person observing an escape or attempted escape shall write a report of the incident and submit it to the department head and law enforcement.